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Adaptive Hidden Markov Model with Anomaly
States for Price Manipulation Detection
Yi Cao, Yuhua Li, Sonya Coleman, Ammar Belatreche, T.M.McGinnity
Abstract—Price manipulation refers to the activities of those
traders who utilise carefully designed trading behaviours to man-
ually push up or down the underlying equity prices for making
profits. With increasing volumes and frequency of trading, price
manipulation can be extremely damaging to the proper func-
tioning and integrity of capital markets. Existing work focuses
on either empirical studies of market abuse cases or analysis
of particular manipulation types based on certain assumptions.
Effective approaches for analysing and detecting price manipu-
lation in real-time are yet to be developed. This paper proposes
a novel approach, called Adaptive Hidden Markov Model with
anomaly States (AHMMAS) for modelling and detecting price
manipulation activities. Together with wavelet transformations
and gradients as the feature extraction methods, the AHMMAS
model caters for price manipulation detection and basic manip-
ulation type recognition. The evaluation experiments conducted
on seven stock tick data from NASDAQ and the London Stock
Exchange and ten simulated stock prices by stochastic differential
equation show that the proposed AHMMAS model can effectively
detect price manipulation patterns and outperforms the selected
benchmark models.
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection, Price Manipulation, Capital
Market Microstructure, Hidden Markov Model, Market Abuse,
Feature Extraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Risk management has been a major concern for banks,
portfolio managers and companies concerned with stock ex-
change transactions for many years. However, new aspects of
risk management have been identified by regulators after the
financial crisis in 2008 and especially since the flash crash
in 2010. One important aspect is the surveillance of financial
exchange market for preventing market abuse activities. The
abuse of financial markets can take on a variety of forms, all
of which can be extremely damaging to the proper functioning
and integrity of the market. The forms contain three primary
categories, namely information based manipulation, where
false information (financial rumour) is released to affect the
equity price, action based manipulation, where the equity price
is changed by actions of squeezing the supply/demand of the
equity, and trade based manipulation, where the equity price
is shifted only by simply buying and selling [1]. A major
format of the trade based abuse is price manipulation, where
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the manipulation tactic targets the equity bid/ask prices only
[1], [2].
Compared with the information and action based manipula-
tions, trade based manipulation usually does not contain any
illegitimate actions such as financial rumour spreading and
market resource squeezing but is carried out only by legal
trading activities. With carefully designed selling and buying
sequences, manipulators could make the market bid/ask price
change following their expectation. In the price manipulation
tactics, a series of trading actions are often linked in contextual
relationships. The monitoring of any single action would not
contribute to a thorough detection of the underlying problem.
This is the main challenge of such price manipulation detection
algorithms. Another challenge arises from the fact that the
manipulation behaviours are often not obvious when mixed
with a mass of normal trading records. The evolution of
manipulation strategies over time is also a challenge for the
detection algorithms. Most of the existing related literature
empirically studies the manipulations and the corresponding
market responses. Very few works analyse the features of
different price manipulation strategies and the corresponding
detection approaches.
A number of pioneering papers introduced by White in [3],
such as trading the foreign exchange by the neuro-wavelet
hybrid system [4] and forecasting the bond price by least-
square support vector machine [5], opened the door for more
advances in modelling and predicting financial markets using
computationally intelligent techniques. These received fresh
attention after the 2007-2009 financial crisis recede. More
accurate results than the traditional models were reported [6],
[7]. Inspired by finds in those literatures, we proposed an ap-
proach that considers the challenges of the price manipulation
detection problem. In this approach, we formulate the problem
based on the analysis of typical cases, extract the intrinsic
features of the manipulation patterns and present a new model
to detect price manipulation activities. The main contributions
of our work are as follows.
The problem of price manipulation is discussed together
with the analysis of three typical examples, from which the key
feature patterns are extracted. This provides a clear problem
formulation and explains the significance of exploring the
price manipulation patterns. A Hidden Markov Model with
Anomaly States (HMMAS) is proposed to model and detect
the price manipulation patterns. The HMMAS makes a detec-
tion decision based on a sequence of price information rather
than a single value at a given time instant. The price manipula-
tion types are also quantified and designated by the HMMAS
based on the features of each manipulation type. To the best of
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our knowledge, this is a novel application of traditional Hidden
Markov Model customized to solving market abuse detection.
To enhance the adaptability of the HMMAS, a traditional “re-
training” mechanism is proposed for automatically tracking
the changes in the statistical properties of the financial time
series. Substantial experiments have been conducted on both
real data from primary USA and UK markets for testing
the practicability on real-life and simulated data for testing
the robustness to non-stationarity. This verification mechanism
provides a complete spectrum of workability testing from both
business and theoretic perspectives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section
II provides a brief review of price manipulation and the
corresponding detection methods as well as the analysis of the
manipulation cases and the formulated detection logic. The
features of basic price manipulation cases are characterised
and extracted by the proposed approaches in Section III.
Section IV presents the proposed AHMMAS approach for
detecting patterns of price manipulation. Performance eval-
uation of the proposed approach is provided in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and discusses potential
improvements and future work.
II. PRICE MANIPULATION AND ITS DETECTION
A. Price Manipulation
In capital markets, limit orders, the instructions to buy or
sell equities, are submitted by investors to the electronic trad-
ing platform of one exchange market. The limit orders indicate
the trading intention of the investor to buy or sell volumes of
a specific equity at a specific price. The trading occurs once
there are eligible matched orders from the investors. Among
those outstanding unmatched limit orders, the highest price
investors are willing to pay for an equity determines the bid
price and the lowest price at which investors are willing to
sell an equity decides the ask price. The gap between the bid
and ask price is defined as the bid-ask spread [8].
Price manipulation can be carried out in many different
forms [9]. One primary form is termed ramping (or gouging
[10] and momentum ignition [11]), where one investor enters
a buy/sell order, usually called a “spoofing order” at a price
which is higher/lower than the bid/ask to create the appearance
of active interest in a security, followed by a “bona fide”
order on the opposite side of the order book waiting to be
executed, subsequently followed by the withdrawal of the first
order when the “bona fide” order was mostly executed. Once
the “spoofing order” is created, a price upward/downward
movement is expected from the manipulator and latter ac-
tions are followed only when there is an enough potential
profit for the investor. Ramping has roughly the same effect
as another two forms of price manipulation, pump&dump
and capping&pegging schemes [10], where the profit mak-
ing approachs are different. In pump&dump, the exchange
participants make profit by carrying out a quick flip at the
manipulated price to remove the already held long positions
(Holding of shares of a stock is said to be “has a long position”
in the stock.). In capping&pegging, the held derivative (e.g.,
call option, defined as an agreement that gives an investor
the right to buy a stock at a specific price within a specific
time period.) of the manipulated security is exercised if a
price increase is generated. If the profit is exploited in another
market, the form of price manipulation is then termed as
cross order/market. If the closing price is manipulated, the
manipulation is termed as near close.
In September 2012, an analogous type of ramping was
reported and documented by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority of the USA [12]. In this case, a liquidity-enhancing
strategy, quote stuffing, was used for creating the fictitious wild
impression of the buying interest on the bid side. As a result
of the quote stuffing, where a mass of “non-bona fide orders”
was submitted, the best bid price was pushed up 6.9 basis
points (bps) 1 and hence the bid-ask spread was narrowed by
87.5%. The manipulators have benefited from the trading on
their previous submitted order on the ask side at the pushed
price. The manipulation process lasted for only 819ms and
the cancellation time of the “non-bona fide orders” was only
767ms.
Quote stuffing is one of the dominant manipulation strategies
in a number of major exchange markets in Europe and USA
[11], [13]. It floods the market with massive numbers of
new orders, which are then cancelled in rapid successions
for creating a large number of successive new best bid/ask
quoting, each potentially acting as a bait of an opposite order,
upon which the potential profit might be realized. The only
difference between ramping and quote stuffing is that the latter
sweeps the order book with more spoofing orders and faster
cancellation time.
As a summary, all of the above-mentioned forms of price
manipulation refer to the same tactic: submitting “non-bona
fide” orders to the market, taking advantage of the shifted
prices (if expected changes occurred), where the profits are
made by distinct ways in various profit-making scenarios as
shown in Fig. 1 and Table I.
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Fig. 1: Price manipulation.
TABLE I: Price manipulation
Mani. Types Typical Scenarios
ramping or Gouging liquid stocks price manipulation
or quote stuffing and the profit from opposite
or capping & pegging orders or positions
pump & dump manipulation cross stock
or option markets.
near close market closing price manipulation.
1A basis point is a unit equal to one hundredth of a percentage point.
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B. Price Manipulation Detection
The detection of price manipulation has however been less
studied in contrast to the volume of theoretical and empiri-
cal work on the manipulation activities. Two computational
approaches for detecting trade based manipulation within the
emerging Istanbul Stock Market, logistic regression with an
artificial neural network and support vector machine, have
been studied and compared [14]. The detection was based on
empirical studies of the statistical features of daily return, daily
trading volume and daily volatilities. Higher deviations from
the non-manipulated cases indicated manipulation. Similar
work has been done by firstly studying the manipulated case
pursued by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)
and constructing a manipulated cases dataset, then modelling
the returns, liquidity and volatility as well as the news and
events related to the stocks during the manipulation period by
linear and logistic regression [15]. Evaluations and compar-
isons of different techniques were presented in [14], [15], yet
both studies lack reliable quantitative analysis of the relation-
ship between the manipulation tactic and the relevant features
such as return, trading volume, liquidity and volatility, which
in most of cases are the result of economic cycles, market
(index) moves and even public events. The detection models
based on the significant deviation of those market attributes
are doomed to suffer from the error rate of the unusual but
legitimate activities that are recognised as manipulation [14],
[15]. Therefore there is a knowledge gap between the data
features and the detection techniques.
A very simple technique, association rule, has been pro-
posed for detecting the closing price manipulation in the Thai
Bond Market [16]. The approach was based on the assumption
that the trading time of a trader should be random regardless
of the traders. Therefore, any association between a trader
and the transaction orders may indicate price manipulation.
This approach has been stated as a supplementary to the
existing surveillance system within the Thai Bond Market for
identifying a specific type of trade based manipulation [16]
rather than a general detection approach.
A market close “Ramping” detection algorithm devel-
oped by Smarts Group International, a surveillance tech-
nique provider, and applied in NASDAQ OMX for assisting
regulators and brokers in detecting trade-based manipulation
was discussed in [17]. This work mainly focused on the
empirical study of relationships between the market efficiency
and the manipulations detected by the algorithm from Smarts
Group rather than the analysis of detection algorithms. The
algorithm detected market close “Ramping” according to the
historical price change where the threshold was set as the 99%
histogram distribution cut-off of the historical price change
during the benchmark period. A market close “Ramping”
alert was triggered if the changes of the closing price and
the price 15 minutes prior were greater than the chosen
threshold [17]. Though straight forward, the market proven
detection approach from Smarts Group International provided
an industry reference for the study presented in this paper.
To date research has mainly focused on the detection of
manipulation in pre-recorded datasets according to the as-
sumptions from empirical studies. To the best of our knowl-
edge, only limited efforts appear to have been made in deep
analysis of the strategic behaviour of price manipulation tactic
[18] and to a lesser extent on computational modelling of the
manipulation strategies [17] which is the focus of this paper.
C. Problem Formulation
During the price manipulation period, a significant price
change is the expected effect of the “spoofing” orders by
the manipulators. The change is not realized incidentally by
heuristic attempts of order submission but by careful designs
based on the market microstructure theories, called market
impact, which is defined as the impact of the trader’s own
actions on the market [19]. The quantitative research in [20]
estimated that a quote that is even slightly higher (5 bps)
than the bid price can induce a further 5.95 bps increase of
the market best bid price. For normal traders, measuring and
eliminating the market impact is crucial for trading models
[19]. However, for the market manipulators, the market impact
is what they utilize in the strategies for making economical
profit.
The documented manipulation case of quote stuffing shown
in Fig 2(a), showed an actual market impact scenario. After
placing a “bona fide” sell order at an expected price, a num-
ber of “non-bona fide” buy orders with quotes successively
higher than the best bid price were submitted to make it
appear that there was active buying interest on that equity.
Somebody who was encouraged by the fictitious bid price
changes responded to the “bona fide” sell order. Immediately
after the sell order was nearly executed, the previous bid
quoting orders were all cancelled, which steeply dropped the
bid price to its initial level. To minimize the risk of the
buy spoofing orders being unintentionally picked up by other
investors, the manipulation process usually occurred within
an extremely short time period. By the sequential quotes and
quick cancellations, the “non-bona fide” orders in Fig 2(a)
made a sawtooth shaped market impact on the bid price.
Thus this price manipulation case can be illustrated as an
instantaneous sawtooth pattern on the bid price time series.
The “sawtooth pattern”, also discovered in [11] and [21], was
identified as one of the highlighted patterns on bid/ask price
time series during manipulation periods [13].
Similarly, the market impact triggered by another price ma-
nipulation type, “ramping”, can also be illustrated by special
patterns on bid/ask price time series. Unlike the activities of
“quote stuffing”, in “ramping”, one single “spoofing order”
was usually placed inside the bid ask spread (higher than the
current bid or lower than the current ask). By this activity, the
manipulated bid/ask price can be moved a small percentage
and reverted to its prior level in tiny time intervals. Small
square wave fluctuations were then shown (Figure 2(c)) as the
pattern of “ramping” [22], which can also occasionally be a
significant movement as illustrated in Figure 2(b). Although
this stunning pulse rising is rare since most exchange markets
such as Euronext NSC suspend continuous trading if prices
change by more than 2% within the defined interval (for
example 1 sec) [20], it is highlighted as one of the typical
manipulation cases in [21].
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The sawtooth, square wave and pulse (Fig. 2) represent
the intrinsic patterns corresponding to the primary manipu-
lation tactics. A mixture of such patterns have been found
in real manipulation cases [11]. Consequently, the problem
of detecting price manipulation activities can be transformed
to the problem of detecting unusual/anomalous patterns in the
bid/ask price time series. This transformation also corresponds
with the “stock-volatility rules” released in April 2013 by
SEC in the USA, which allows trading only within certain
price bands to avoid unusually volatile trading behaviours
[23]. Since the manipulation activities usually occur in tiny
time intervals within one single trading day, the scope of our
problem is to detect unusual/anomalous patterns in intra-day
bid/ask price time series. The time scale is discretely measured
in terms of bid/ask price update event. Hence, the adjustment
speed measured in physical time ultimately depends on the
underlying frequency of order activities and differs across the
market.
In the financial area, it is often believed that the nature of the
bid/ask price follows the mean-reverting feature, the tendency
to randomly oscillate away from and, over time, back towards
an “equilibrium” price level determined by the long-term mean
of the equity [24]. Studies that support the mean-reversion
features can be traced back to 1930s in the empirical studies
in [25] and then furthered in [26], [27].
The price fluctuations triggered by the manipulation strate-
gies are merely the unusual short-termed momentary oscil-
lations with small amplitudes around the “equilibrium” level
of the price (6.9 bps in Figure 2(a) and 18.6 bps in Figure
2(c)). Those tiny oscillations are usually considered as the
“contamination” of the financial data [28], [29]. For studies
of financial time series, it is very important to reveal the
true signal from the financial data series [29], which con-
tains short, high-frequency “noisy” transients as well as long,
low-frequency movement. For price manipulation detection,
the high-frequency “noisy” parts are where the manipulation
patterns hide. Accordingly, retrieving and directly analysing
those high-frequency components as well as the original price
information might help develop an effective detection model.
III. CHARACTERISING PRICE MANIPULATION
The detection system proposed in this paper is comprised
of a feature extraction module and a detection model, where
the model is trained based on the features extracted from the
equity bid/ask price by the feature extraction module.
A. Price Manipulation Features
The three patterns that characterise typical price manipula-
tions can be defined in two ways: remarkable pulse (Fig. 2(b))
or short term small fluctuations (sawtooth and square in Fig.
2(a) and 2(c). The intuitive feature of the three patterns can
be extracted as the rate of price (bid/ask) change, which is
defined as the first order derivative of P (t) with respect to
t, dP (t)dt = limΔt→0
P (t+Δt)−P (t)
Δt , where Δt is the time interval
between the changes of the ask/bid prices.
Empirical mode decomposition (EMD), continuous wavelet
transform (CWT) and synchrosqueezed transform (SST) are
commonly used for signal decomposition. EMD is limited by
its rather low frequency resolution [30] and the obtainable
frequency resolution of EMD depends on a critical frequency
limit [31]. CWT can map any signal to a set of base functions
obtained through dilation and translation of a mother wavelet,
and it is able to achieve decomposition of the signals in
different frequency bands and at different time points [32].
Unlike Fourier transform, which gives a representation of fre-
quency content of a signal without time information, the time-
frequency localization feature of CWT describes the frequency
content “locally” in time by “scale” and “shift” parameters
[32]. SST extends the CWT by reallocating the wavelet
coefficients through further calculating the first derivative
(instantaneous frequency) of the coefficients, which is named
as synchrosqueezing [33]. SST has been recently applied as a
bandpass filter for removing high frequency components from
a signal in [34]. In our work, to retrieve and analyse the high-
frequency components of the bid/ask prices, wavelet transform
is applied as a feature extraction approach due to its wide and
successful application in finance [29], [35].
The wavelet decomposition of a signal results in levels
of approximation coefficients and detailed coefficients. The
approximation coefficient vector reflects the low-frequency
features and the detail coefficient vector reflects the high-
frequency component of the signal. To retrieve the high
frequency components and remove the low-frequency “equi-
librium” component, the detail coefficient “hard” thresholding
method, which is usually applied in financial signal de-noising
[29], is applied inversely, so that the wavelet coefficients
outside the thresholds are set to zeros:
Tm,n =
{
=Tm,n if |Tm,n| ≤ λ
=0 if |Tm,n| > λ
(1)
where Tm,n is the detail coefficient; m,n are scale and
shifting parameters of the wavelet function respectively and
λ is the fixed threshold. The wavelet and inverse thresholding
procedure consist of three steps: (1) Calculate the wavelet co-
efficient vectors {Tm,n, Tm−1,n, ..., T1,n} by discrete wavelet
transform; (2) Select a threshold λ and filter the coefficient
vectors by through the “hard” thresholding in Equation 1; (3)
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Recompose the data using the filtered wavelet coefficients.
In this paper, Symlets wavelet is chosen and applied for
extracting the high frequency components (denoted by Pˆt) of
an equity price Pt. Since the short term small fluctuation is
only associated with high frequency components, we also refer
to Pˆt as the short term small fluctuation.
B. Features Extraction
The first order derivatives of the original price P t as well as
the short term oscillation Pˆt with respect to time are extracted
as the features of the patterns of price manipulation. To capture
this, the gradient of Pt and Pˆt are all calculated. Among the
methods for calculating gradients, finite-difference is chosen
and its central difference form is used since it is widely used in
the finance area [36]: df(t)dt ≈
f(t+ 12Δt)−f(t− 12Δt)
Δt , where f(t)
represents Pt and Pˆt and Δt is the time interval between the
changes of ask/bid prices. As discussed in Section III-A, three
representative manipulation patterns are defined by significant
pulse (Fig. 2(b)) and short term small fluctuations, where the
former is associated with original price change rate dPtdt and
the latter mainly corresponds to the high-frequency oscillations
dPˆt
dt .
Financial data usually contain low-frequency trend com-
ponent upon which a variety of different frequencies are
superimposed [34]. From a financial perspective, dPtdt and dPˆtdt
represent the features of the original and the de-trended (low-
frequency component removed) prices, which intrinsically
correlated with some typical price manipulation activities as
previously discussed. Those two patterns that emerged with
price manipulation activities persist regardless of the price
manipulation forms (Table. I). At the same time, P t and Pˆt are
correlated with the unusual pulses and large square patterns.
Accordingly, all of the four values, Pt, Pˆt, dPtdt and
dPˆt
dt ,
should be included as features to cover all the possible ma-
nipulation circumstances (sawtooth, pulse and square patterns).
The structure of the feature extraction module comprises a
wavelet filter and gradient calculator and is shown in Fig. 3.
bid/ask
Gradient 
Calculator
Wavelet 
Filter
tP
dtdPt /
dtPd t /ˆ
tPˆ
Feature Extraction Module
Fig. 3: Feature extraction module
An example of the output of the feature extraction module
is shown in Figure 4. The bid/ask price Pt is filtered by the
Symlets wavelet at level 8. The smoothed “equilibrium” values
(illustrated by a dotted line in Figure 4(a)) are removed and the
short term oscillation Pˆt is extracted (Fig. 4(b)). The gradients
of Pt and Pˆt are both calculated and illustrated in Fig. 4(c)
and 4(d) respectively.
IV. DETECTION MODEL
Financial data are considered non-stationary in nature,
meaning that the statistical properties (e.g. mean and variance)
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of the data change over time [37]. These changes are caused
by various business and economic cycles in the longer term
and demand-supply microstructures in the short term [38]. Of
particular interest is the tendency of any unusual activities to
exhibit a degree of non-stationarity of the extracted features.
That is, the distribution of the extracted features changes
over its duration. This may be interpreted as resulting from
some of the irregular trading behaviours shown in Fig. 2.
Hence, the detection model must be adopted to first capture
the distributions of the extracted features and then detect the
shifts in them.
A. Gaussian Mixture Model and Hidden Markov Model
A common solution for modelling the probability density
function (PDF) of an observed variable is to approximate its
unknown density with a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
[39]. A GMM is a weighted sum of M component Gaus-
sian densities as p(x) =
∑M
i=1 wig(x|μi,Σi), where x is a
D−dimension continuous-valued data vector, w i, i = 1, ...,M ,
are the mixture weights, and g(x|μi,Σi), i = 1, ...,M, are
the component Gaussian densities. Each component density
is a D−variate Gaussian function. Traditional GMM runs
Expectation Maximization (EM) based on heuristic trials for
the number of Gaussian components. To overcome this, a
Dirichlet Process Gaussian Mixture Model (DPGMM) [40],
which provides a statistically principled manner for generating
the number of the GMM components, is applied in our
approach. DPGMM is the same as a regular GMM, except
the component parameters drawn from a Dirichlet process
as a prior probability [40] and the Gibbs sampling from the
posterior probabilities [40].
In the price manipulation detection problem, the PDFs of ex-
tracted features of an equity price are modelled with DPGMM.
The observed changes of the features can be detected by
testing which mixture component dominates the given value.
This gives a simplified state view of the features. The temporal
changes of distribution are probabilistically related to the
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changes of the observed features and the observed features
sequences instead of any single values decide the potential ma-
nipulation. Such cases can be modelled by a Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) containing two sets of states, “observable”
feature states and “hidden” mixture components states, which
are assumed to depend only upon the previous states and
modelled as a standard Markov process.
Usually, the application of a HMM in condition monitoring
problems falls into two categories: signature modelling, where
the detection model is learned from the activities to be
recognised and the activities matching the model are reported
as the detection results [41], [42], and anomaly detection,
where a model of normality is learned from only the “normal
activities” and the test cases “against” the model according to
the pre-defined threshold are reported as anomalies [43], [44].
Due to the limited reports of market manipulation and
regulatory rules prohibiting the disclosure of data which
represents illegitimate trading behaviours, the availability of
examples of market manipulation behaviours in capital market
is far less than the availability of routine normal behaviour.
Consequently, price manipulation detection can be considered
as an anomaly detection problem, which is the identification
of new or unknown data patterns, to which a learning system
has not been exposed during training. In this approach, normal
bid/ask price patterns are modelled and the system will trigger
an alarm when the behaviour of the market action does not
match with normal patterns. However, three problems arise in
this approach when applied to price manipulation detection.
1) HMM is usually used to model 1-dimensional sequential
data rather than multiple features.
2) Anomaly detection using HMM usually lacks the ability
of recognizing the anomaly type and the probability
density of being that type.
3) The PDFs of the equity price evolve due to the non-
stationary feature of financial time series.
In order to address these challenges, an improved adaptive
HMM with anomaly states is developed and is presented in
the following two sections.
B. Hidden Markov Model with Anomaly States (HMMAS)
For a bid/ask price of an equity with T points, four
features are extracted by the module illustrated in Fig. 3.
Letting F t, (t = 1, ..., T ) be the feature vector at the tth
point in time, the pre-processed four features at time t,
F t = [F
o
t , F
og
t , F
s
t , F
sg
t ], are described as follows:
1) original price: F ot ;
2) gradient of the of original price: F ogt ;
3) short-term fluctuation: F st ;
4) gradient of the short-term fluctuation: F sgt ;
The PDFs of the four features are learned separately by the
Gaussian Mixture Model. Since the PDF of each feature
might have multiple Gaussian components, the changes of
the observation distribution can be detected by testing which
mixture component in the PDF was most likely to have
generated a given value. Those mixture components are then
designated as hidden states of the observed equity price. This
gives a simplified “state view” of time series data.
For the learned PDFs, anomaly thresholds separating the
normal and anomaly are set according to the minimum ac-
ceptable data likelihood value, which is adopted from the
industry reference detection algorithm from Smart Group [17]:
the 99% cumulative distribution cut-off. That means, the data
are accepted as “normal” for which P (F t) ≥ 99%. This is to
identify the highest and lowest 0.5% frequent values for each
feature. This heuristic method is also applied in a one-class
Support Vector Machine [45], where the detection boundary
is usually set to include most (for example 99%), but not
all, training data to avoid high miss detection rate. By doing
this, the 1% extreme values are not simply assumed to be
“abnormalities” but generate the “dummy anomaly states” for
the Hidden Markov Model.
Figure 5 shows an example of the PDFs of four features of
the time series data. The PDFs of the features are learned
by the GMM. Two thresholds (shown by dotted lines) are
set to 0.5% and 99.5% cumulative probability of each PDF,
separating the “normal” and “anomaly” regions. Figure 5(a)
shows a PDF of an equity price (illustrated by the small
circles) with three Gaussian components (illustrated by the
solid line). The thresholds (illustrated by the dotted lines) are
set such that the 99% cumulative distribution of the equity
prices are accepted as being “normal” leaving the maximal
and minimal 0.5% as being “anomalies”. By this, the PDF
of the original equity price can be partitioned into four parts:
three parts corresponding to three Gaussian components in the
“normal” region and one corresponding to the regions with
“anomalies” values (both maximal and minimal). The four
parts can then be designated as four hidden states respectively
for the equity price feature as illustrated in Fig. 6. Defining
those hidden states as
{
fojo , jo = 1, . . . , 4
}
, we have that the
extracted feature F ot ∈
{
fojo , jo = 1, . . . , 4
}
.
Similarly, two hidden states (one “anomaly” and one
“normal”) are generated for another three 1-component
PDFs (illustrated by Figure 5(b)-5(d)). We can also define{
fogjog , jog = 1, 2
}
,
{
f sjs , js = 1, 2
}
and
{
f sgjsg , jsg = 1, 2
}
as
the hidden states of price gradient, short term oscillation and
oscillation gradients respectively. We also have F ogt ∈
{
fogjog
}
,
F st ∈
{
fsjs
}
and F sgt ∈
{
f sgjsg
}
, where jog, js, jsg = {1, 2}.
The hidden states of all four features are then combined
as the quantized hidden states of the HMMAS model so that
4 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 = 32 hidden states are generated.
The quantized 32-state view of the observed bid/ask
price can be represented as S={Si} ; where Si =[
fojo , f
og
jog
, f sjs , f
sg
jsg
]
; S is a collection of the feature states
Si, i ∈ {1, ..., 32}, jo ∈ {1, ..., 4} and jog, js, jsg ∈ {1, 2}.
Each hidden state contains a unique combination of the feature
status. The state having all features within the “normal” region
is considered as the completely “normal” hidden state and
others having at least one feature within the “anomaly” region
are considered “anomaly” hidden states. Thus only three
among 32 states are “normal” while 29 are “anomaly”.
According to the official definitions of the price manipu-
lation in Market Abuse Directive [9] and the discussion in
Section II, the typical price manipulation types are associated
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(b) Short term oscillation
(right) and its PDF (left).
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(c) Gradient of original equity
price (right) and its PDF (left).
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(d) Gradient of short term os-
cillation (right) and its PDF
(left).
Fig. 5: Example of the features learned by GMM. The PDF of
Original Equity Price, the Short Term Oscillation, the Gradient
of Original Equity Price and the Gradient of Oscillation are
plotted. (Legend: 1: PDF; 2: Components of PDF; 3:
Thresholds)
with the combinations of different features status. The types,
quote Stuffing, momentum ignition and gouging, which are fea-
tured by instantaneous sweeping of order books, are essentially
associated with the significant changes of gradients of short
term oscillations and the original price (f sgjsg and f
og
jog
) rather
than the large price fluctuation. Besides, the types, ramping,
pump&dump, capping&pegging and near close are primarily
associated with significant changes of the original price or
short term fluctuations (f ojo and f sjs) but not necessarily related
to the gradients.
Consequently, according to the features status, the 29
“anomaly” states can be combined into three manipulation
states, namely: quote Stuffing, ramping and other anomalies.
The states with only anomalous gradient features fall into
the quote Stuffing while the states with only the anomalous
price features (original and the oscillation) are ramping. The
manipulation state named other anomalies is associated with
the ones in which all of the features are anomalous. By this
merging, the 32 states are further simplified as a six-state view
of the observed bid/ask price with three normal states and
three anomaly states referring to primary manipulation types.
Hence the six hidden states provide a complete spectrum as
well as an efficient way for representing the bid/ask price
shifting triggered by the trading behaviours, where, for brevity,
only the transfers in hidden states are shown rather than the
observed temporal dynamics on each feature. In this way, the
traditional HMM is extended to comprise “anomaly” states
that can not be otherwise achieved, hence the name Hidden
Markov Model with Anomaly States (HMMAS).
The basic property of HMMAS, inherited from the tra-
ditional HMM, is the probabilities yielded by the Viterbi
algorithms, which determines from an observation sequence
the most likely sequence of underlying hidden states that
might have generated it. Together with the probability of an
observed sequence, HMMAS provides a measure of specific
price manipulation type identification according to the states
and the features.
Fig. 6: A hidden Markov model with anomaly states generated
from a sequence of observation of variable. S1, S2 and S3 are
normal states and S4 is the abnormal state.
C. Adaptive HMMAS
Due to the non-stationary feature of financial time series, the
mean and the variance of the PDFs of the equity price might
vary over time. In order to deal with the non-stationarity of
the time series of bid/ask price, the HMMAS is improved by
an adaptive mechanism (and renamed the Adaptive HMMAS
(AHMMAS)) , where the model is trained using the data in
previous specific time periods, defined as a sliding window
with length w. During the course of detecting the price ma-
nipulation activities, the window is slid forward to maintain the
closest w data points and AHMMAS is updated if significant
discrepancies between the w data points in the current sliding
window and the prior training data are detected.
Fig. 7: Non-stationary changes shown by different PDF.
The deviation between the two data sequences is detected
using the t-test. A simple example of the non-stationarity of
equity price is illustrated in Fig. 7. Recall that a process
is strongly stationary whenever its distribution is invariant
under time shifts [46]. Part of the Apple stock bid price on
12 June 2012 Pt, t = 1, ..., 5000 is illustrated in Fig. 7. If
the sliding window length is set to w = 1670, the variant
PDF of the time series in three windows Pt, t = 1, ..., 1670,
Pt, t = 1671, ..., 3240 and Pt, t = 3241, ..., 5000 (illustrated
as the three parts in Fig. 7) are detected as significant changes
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNNLS.2014.2315042
Copyright (c) 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE TRANSACTION ON NEURAL NETWORKS AND LEARNING SYSTEMS, VOL. XXX, NO. XXX, XXX 20XX 8
of the statistical features of the time series by t-test under
the significance level 1%. A t-test module is then designed
as a post-processing block of AHMMAS for detecting the
statistical difference between the updated data sequence in the
sliding window and the previous training data sequence and
a popular significance level, 1%, is chosen for balancing the
trade-off between the computation load and the performance.
The adaptive mechanism of AHMMAS is as shown in
Figure 8. The model is initially trained by w data points in
the Training Window (Ft, t ∈ [ts1, te1], where ts1 and te1 are
starting and ending time points respectively). A new incoming
data point is then detected by the model. If detected as normal,
it will be updated into the Update Window (Ft, t ∈ [ts2, te2])
for testing the statistical difference. As illustrated in Fig. 8, the
data in the sliding window are tested every time the sliding
window is updated, but the model might be re-trained after
working time period t. Since the scope of this paper is to
detect the intra-day price manipulation activities, the Training
Window is set to one day.
D. The Detection Algorithm
The algorithm for detecting the price manipulation activities
by AHMMAS can then be summarized as the following steps.
Algorithm. Price Manipulation Detection
Step 1: For the specific equity E, select a sliding window
length w; Construct the bid/ask price time series P Et from t0
to the current time point tw−1: PEti , ti ∈ [t0, ..., tw−1];
Step 2: Calculate the four feature sequences of P Eti using
wavelet and gradient approaches described above; Obtain the
features vector Fti =
[
F oti , F
og
ti , F
s
ti , F
sg
ti
]
.
Step 3: Construct the AHMMAS detection model:
• Calculate the PDF separately for the features,
F oti , F
og
ti , F
s
ti , F
sg
ti , using the Gaussian Mixture Model
and set the corresponding anomaly thresholds;
• Construct the sub-states for each attributes and then
construct the hidden states by combining four attributes
according to discussion in Section IV-B and the illustra-
tion shown in Fig.6.
Step 4: Train the AHMMAS model using the observed
features and the constructed hidden states.
Step 5: If the testing sequence is not constructed: select a
detection sequence length L; the first testing sequence is then
constructed as PEti , ti ∈ [tw, tw+L−1].
• calculate the four features of the sequence using the
wavelet and gradient blocks,
• feed the features into AHMMAS model for calculating
the probability of being specific states.
Step 6: If the state is identified as any “anomaly” states, the
alert is triggered with the identified possible manipulation
type and the probability of being the type.
Step 7: If the state is among the “normal” states, the bid/ask
price in sliding window tL to tw+L−1 are fed to the adaptive
mechanism for model updating check. If model updating is
needed, the algorithm flow goes to Step 1.
Step 8: If the model updating is not needed, the testing
sequence is afterwards updated as P Eti , ti ∈ [tw+1, tw+L] and
tw1
time
pr
ic
e tw
-1
twtL tw
+L
-1
tw
+L
tw
+1
tw2
ts2
tw3
ts1
L
W
tL+
1
Training 
Window
Testing
Sequence
t0
Fig. 8: Training and testing mechanism of price manipulation
detection system.
the algorithm flow goes to Step 5.
Fig. 8 shows the initial states of the training window and the
testing sequence and the sliding mechanism of each during the
price manipulation detection process. In Fig. 8, the AHMMAS
model was trained with the data in tw1 = PEti , ti ∈ [0, w − 1].
The first testing sequence was constructed as ts1 = PEti , ti ∈
[tw, tw+L−1]. If the detection indicate normal behaviours, the
adaptive mechanism then checks for the significant changes
between the data in the updated training window tw2 =
PEti , ti ∈ [tL, tw+L−1] and the original training window tw1.
If no re-training is required, the training window will slide
forward as tw3 and a new testing sequence will be constructed
as ts2 to include the new data point at tw+L and exclude the
point at tw. Similarly, if no anomaly is detected, the data in the
updated training window tw3 = PEti , ti ∈ [tL+1, tw+L] and in
the original training window tw1 are detected for adaptation.
This detection and updating process continues for all incoming
data streams.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
Evaluating a detection model usually relies on the labelled
benchmarks of both “normal” and “anomaly” cases. Since
the absence of the real market “anomaly” cases, to evaluate
the proposed detection model, it is acceptable to the financial
industry business that all the characteristic patterns of reported
manipulation examples are studied and then reproduced in
other financial data context to synthesize exploratory manipu-
lation cases [47]. Synthetic exploratory financial data are also
accepted in academia for evaluating the proposed model when
real market data are hard to collect [48], [49], [50]. Thus in this
approach, the manipulation cases are synthetically generated
and injected in any financial time series data while maintaining
the normal statistical features such as the mean, variance and
volatility.
A. Experimental Setup
The experimental data used in this work involves two
categories. The data examples in the first category involve real
market data of seven representative stocks: Google, Microsoft,
Intel and Apple from NASDAQ (obtained from the LOBSTER
project [51]) and ARM, BARCLAYS and Vodafone from Lon-
don Stock Exchange (LSE). The selection of these datasets is
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due to their relatively high trading volumes and price volatility,
the factors that might increase the likelihood of manipulation
across the exchanges [18], [52]. This dataset covers tick data
over five trading days (11th-15th June 2012), and consists
of more than 2,000,000 data points in total for each stock.
The data sets have been examined by our financial partners to
guarantee that no data are related to any reported manipulation
cases by the regulators. Additionally, a statistical test widely
used in trading firms [11] is performed on those datasets
targeting intra-day volatility anomalies. The testing is defined
as: an anomalous pattern starting at time t if σt−s,t ≤ 2σ¯
and σt,t+s > 2σ¯, where s is defined as one hour, σt1,t2 is the
volatility over the period (t1, t2) and σ¯ is the average intra-day
volatility across the whole dataset. According to the manual
examination and testing, no manipulation as well as volatility
spikes are involved in those datasets.
The data examples in the second category are simulated
stock prices generated using the stochastic differential equation
(SDE): dSt = A(L − St)dt + stochastic term, where A
is the rate of the mean reversion, L is the value around
which the process St tends to oscillate and the stochastic
term is a Brownian motion process. The end result is that the
stock price tends to be a modulated non-stationary process
of periodic waves and stochastic oscillations [53]. It should
be noted that the price is not assumed to be 100% following
the SDE but is merely to test the validity and robustness of
the detection model under any non-stationary randomness of
equity processes. In this category, there are 10 simulated prices
paths, each containing 2,000,000 time points as illustrated in
Figure 9.
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Fig. 9: 10 simulated prices paths.
Three typical manipulation patterns, shown in Fig. 2, are
reproduced within each equity following the original charac-
teristics: 6.9 bps sawtooth patterns in 819 ms, 18.6 bps square
wave in 0.1 s and 800 bps pulse in 1 s. Those anomalies are
then injected into the corresponding time series making the test
data a mixture of both “normal” and “anomaly” patterns. The
trained models are deployed on the mixed test data to detect
anomaly patterns. This is practical and acceptable to business
people [54], especially when it is very costly to obtain real
manipulation cases.
Since the length of the sliding window for the adaptive
mechanism is set to be one day, for the real market data in
the first testcase category, the data on 11 June 2012, the first
day among the five, are chosen as the training dataset, which
contains around 400,000 points. The 5-fold cross-validation
is used on the 400,000 data points for training the detection
model. The data in days 12-15 June 2012 are set as the testing
dataset. Similarly, for the simulated stock price in the second
category, the data are equally partitioned into five sets, each
of which contains exactly 400,000 points. The training dataset
consists of the first set and the testing dataset consists of the
other four sets. The 5-folder cross-validation is used on the
training dataset for constructing the detection model. Since
the manipulation activities usually occur in an extremely short
time period, the testing sequence length L (Fig. 8) is set to
1 minute, which is sufficient for one or two manipulation
patterns.
To ensure comprehensive assessment of the approach, mul-
tiple testing datasets are built on both real market data and
simulated data. For real stock prices, 300 synthesized patterns
are injected to each dataset with each type having 100 ex-
amples (One pattern in Fig. 2 is considered as one anomaly
example.). For the simulated stock prices, five groups of test-
cases n = 1, ..., 5 are generated and injected to each dataset,
where group n = 1 contains 10 (examples/type)*3(types)=30
total numbers of injected anomaly examples; group n = 2 has
20 ∗ 3 = 60 numbers and group n = 3, 4, 5 has 40 ∗ 3 = 120,
80 ∗ 3 = 240, and 100 ∗ 3 = 300 total numbers of injected
anomaly examples respectively.
As discussed in Section II-B, some generic computational
models were used for manipulation detection such as SVM,
neural network and logistic regression in [14], [15] as well
as the rule based algorithms in [16], [17]. Since the rule
based algorithms were specific for the special manipulation
scenarios discussed in [16], [17], they are not suitable for
general manipulation detection problems. According to those
related work, we choose three popular computational models
as the benchmarks of our model: one-class support vector
machine (OCSVM) [45], k Nearest Neighbour (kNN) [39]
and Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [39]. Those bench-
mark models are applied on the same feature vector F t =
[F ot , F
og
t , F
s
t , F
sg
t ]. In our experiments, LIBSVM [55] and
DDTool [56], are used as the implementation of the benchmark
models. All the model parameters (i.e., kernel width for
OCSVM, k value for kNN and the number of components
for GMM) are fine-tuned through 5-folder cross-validation on
each different dataset for stable and optimized testing results.
The performance evaluation of the proposed model is based
on two types of metrics, the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) and F-measure. Both of them are based on the confu-
sion matrix, where false positive (FP ), is defined as manip-
ulation cases detected as normal and false negative (FN ) is
defined as normal cases detected as manipulation, true positive
(TP ) is defined as normal cases detected as normal and true
negative (TN ) is defined as manipulation cases detected as
manipulation. The ROC curve is a widely used metric for
evaluating and comparing binary classifiers [57]. The ROC
curve plots the true positive rate ( TPTP+FN ) against the false
positive rate ( FPFP+TN ) while the discrimination threshold of
the binary classifier is varied. In order to assess the overall
performance of a binary classifier, one can measure the area
under the ROC curve (AUC). The maximum value of AUC
is 1 and therefore larger AUC values indicate generally better
classification performance. The ROC curve and AUC are used
as the performance measure on seven real stock datasets. The
F-measure integrates both precision and sensitivity into one
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single metric and widely used in anomaly/novelty detection
area [58]. The F-measure is used for evaluating the testing
performance on simulated datasets.
B. Experimental Results
The ROC curves of four models on seven real-stock datasets
with 3*100 = 300 numbers of injected novelties in each
dataset are illustrated in Figure 10. To compute such a curve,
the discrimination thresholds are set from 0.1 to 0.9 with
increment, 0.01, for each model. The calculated AUC values
for four models are summarized in Table II.
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Fig. 10: ROC of four models on 7 stock datasets. (TPR: Ture
Positive Rate; FPR: False Positive Rate.)
TABLE II: AUC of four detection models on seven real stock
datasets
AUC AHMMAS OCSVM kNN GMM
AAPL 0.8142 0.6603 0.7926 0.6695
ARM 0.8270 0.5830 0.7982 0.7918
BARC 0.8710 0.6125 0.7627 0.6466
GOOG 0.8025 0.6593 0.5612 0.6163
INTC 0.8971 0.6970 0.6280 0.5200
MSFT 0.7336 0.6419 0.6250 0.6802
VOD 0.8775 0.7044 0.7278 0.7495
The AHMMAS model achieved the highest AUC on all
of the seven real stock price datasets and it outperforms the
benchmark models. The best AUC value for AHMMAS model
appears on the Intel dataset (0.8971), which is 22%, 29% and
42% higher than OCSVM (0.6970), kNN (0.6280) and GMM
(0.5200) models respectively. The second best AUC value
for AHMMAS model is on the Vodafone dataset (0.8775),
which is around 15-20% better than other three models. The
lowest AUC value for AHMMAS model is on the Microsoft
dataset (0.7336) and is still 12%, 14% and 7% higher than
OCSVM (0.6419), kNN (0.6250) and GMM (0.6802) models
respectively. The performance difference between the AHM-
MAS model and other three models in terms of the AUC
values are calculated on seven stock datasets as (AUCAHMMAS-
AUCothers)/AUCAHMMAS and are illustrated in Fig. 11, where the
legends, OCSVM, kNN and GMM, represent the performance
differences between AHMMAS and OCSVM, kNN and GMM
model respectively.
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Fig. 11: Performance Difference between AHMMAS and other
models on 7 datasets.
The lowest value of the difference is between the AHMMAS
and kNN models on Apple dataset, where the AHMMAS
model (0.8142) performed 2.6% better than the kNN model
(0.7926). The minimum value indicates the roughly identical
performance of AHMMAS and kNN models on Apple dataset.
The largest value of the difference is between the AHMMAS
and GMM models on Intel dataset, where AHMMAS model
(0.8971) performed 42% better than GMM model (0.5200).
This is where AHMMAS performs the best among all the
testcases. From Fig. 11, it is also obviously that the perfor-
mance difference between AHMMAS and OCSVM models
is relatively stable in range from 12% to 30% over different
datasets while the other two performance differences are both
volatile in range from 2% to 46%.
The performance comparison shows that the AHMMAS
model retains its advantage over all other models on seven real
market datasets. It also indicates the performance stabilities of
the three benchmark models, among which, OCSVM model
performed relatively steady while the kNN and GMM model
performed volatile across the different datasets.
The performance of the four models on ten simulated prices
datasets is evaluated based on F-measure metrics as shown
in Fig. 12 where the horizontal axis represents the number
of injected anomaly examples and the vertical axis represents
the value of the F-measure. As discussed before, the models
are tested on ten simulated datasets, each of which contains
five groups of injected anomaly examples. Thus 50 different
experiments are carried out as a robust evaluation plan for
each model.
From the results in Fig. 12, the AHMMAS model achieved
the highest F-measure among the four models on most of the
10 datasets. In the case of simulated price #6 with 10 injected
anomaly examples, the initial F-measure for the AHMMAS
model (0.8081) is lower than that of OCSVM (0.8791). But
the performance of AHMMAS increased on this testcase as
the number of anomaly examples increased. Another case is
on simulated price #7 with 10 injected anomaly examples, the
F-measure for AHMMAS model (0.8535) is very close to kNN
model (0.8506) but increased on the testcases with 20 injected
anomaly examples.
C. Discussion
The experiments on real and simulated price datasets have
shown that the AHMMAS model outperforms the other three
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Fig. 12: F-measure of four models on simulated prices. (X-
axis: Number of Anomalies; Y-axis: F-measure.)
benchmark models: OCSVM, kNN and GMM. The robustness
can be explained by the inherited nature from Hidden Markov
Model on time series data modelling, where the algorithm does
not simple-mindedly accept the most likely state for a given
time instant, but takes a decision based on the whole sequence.
Thus, if there are some particularly normal events midway
through a sequence of anomalies, this will not matter provided
the whole context of what is seen is reasonable. This is partic-
ularly valuable in price manipulation detection where normal
and manipulation trading behaviours may be interleaved, but
the overall sense of the events may be detectable. However,
other detection models are trained for building tightly enclosed
boundaries, which consider the testing examples as a set of
separate points.
Another reason for the robust test results is the adaptive
mechanism. Due to the non-stationary feature, the distribution
of financial time series data xt1 , ..., xtl may deviate from
xt1+τ , ..., xtl+τ . Detecting the statistically deviated data by
a constant model increases the risk of obtaining incorrect
detections. The mechanism of capturing the significant differ-
ence and updating the detection model provides a reasonable
compensation for the non-stationarity.
The AHMMAS model performs distinctly on different
datasets. In Table II, most of the AUC values for AHMMAS
model go beyond 0.8, which is considered as a threshold of
good performance for a classifier [57]. However, the result for
Microsoft dataset is lower than others (0.7336) and is even
8.5% lower than the 2nd lowest AUC (0.8025) on Google
dataset. Further investigation showed that the small AUC on
Microsoft dataset is due to the relatively high false negative
numbers (normal cases detected as anomaly) decreasing the
true positive rate on each discrimination threshold. After
examining the false negative misclassification cases and com-
paring the training and testing datasets, it was discovered
that the normal patterns in the testing dataset that failed to
be detected as normal were in fact identical to the anomaly
patterns shown in Fig. 2 and were never seen in the training
dataset. In the example of the normal Microsoft testing dataset
(no anomaly pattern injected) shown in Fig. 13, the bid price
from 8:00:00am to 8:01:00am on 12 June 2012 oscillated
unusually and showed mixed patterns of sawtooth and square
wave, which are very easily identified as the anomalies by the
detection model.
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Fig. 13: Microsoft stock bid price from 8:00:00am to
8:01:40am on 12 Jun 2012: Normal data showed anomaly
patterns.
Consultation with financial experts from industry suggested
that although rarely, such “normal” but wild oscillation some-
times happen especially when experiencing high frequency
trading (HFT). Although HFT is out of the scope of this work
due to its hyper-fast trading speed (e.g., 1000 updates in 1
millisecond), the wild oscillations in Fig. 13 show analogous
patterns as the manipulation algorithm triggered by HFT. The
oscillation also conforms with the recent report from Nanex
[59] that stock of Paychex showed the wild sawtooth oscilla-
tion when being hit by a high frequency trading algorithm. The
wild pattern is identical to the manipulation case documented
in 2012 (Fig. 2(a)) although not reported by regulators yet.
Therefore, although the false negative cases (normal cases
mis-classified as anomaly) seem to decrease the detection
performance, most of them referred to suspicious trading
activities which are identical to the reported manipulation
cases.
From the experimental results and the analysis of the mis-
classification, it can be concluded that the AHMMAS model
is better suited for the price manipulation detection problem
based on a bid/ask price time series and its performance is
consistently superior to OCSVM, kNN and GMM models
under most of the randomness of the non-stationarity of the
underlying equity price.
Based on consultations with financial experts, “real-time”
surveillance in practice is required by the trading floor to
recognise any unusual patterns, which are used as a reference
to adapt their trading behaviours accordingly. Therefore, they
do not conclusively determine the intention behind every
anomaly or the contextual relation between those patterns but
mitigate any possible negative impacts on their portfolios from
the obvious problems in the market (e.g. the flash crash).
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Instead, the proposed method determines the manipulation by
considering the anomalies as well as their contextual relations
(through the Markov chain). The detection increases the accu-
racy while sacrificing the efficiency for “real-time” detection,
which essentially may not be the first priority for regulators.
Therefore, AHMMAS best suits the “over-night” detection in
real world considering the computational complexity of the
proposed method.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a computational intelligence approach
for price manipulation detection. Typical price manipulation
cases were studied, where special patterns of the bid and
ask price during a manipulation period were analysed for
extracting reliable features. Based on the extracted features,
an adaptive Hidden Markov Model with anomaly States (AH-
MMAS) was proposed for detecting the anomalies in the bid
and ask prices. The AHMMAS considers the anomaly states
according to the thresholds of four extracted features set by the
probability density functions (PDF) of the features. A system
has been developed and intensively tested on both real-life
stock prices and simulated prices. The comparison of proposed
approach with other benchmark models, OCSVM, kNN and
GMM, has shown that the AHMMAS performs better in terms
of the area under ROC curve and the F-measure, respectively.
Finally, the experimental results were analysed and mis-
classification cases were discussed and further explained with
examples.
In the AHMMAS model, the probability density functions
(PDF) of the four extracted features are learned individually
using Dirichlet Process Gaussian Mixture Model (DPGMM).
However, the use of a joint-PDF may offer a more accurate
approach for future studies since there is no empirical study
showing the independence relationship of the four features
and this will be the focus of our future work. Furthermore,
modelling the bid/ask time series with the corresponding order
information may provide a mechanism for decreasing the false
negative rate mentioned before. SST may also provide an
enhanced signal decomposition technique by extending the
traditional wavelet. Meanwhile, the exploration of coupled
behaviours of the bid and ask prices of one stock might help to
enhance the detection results of potential price manipulation
strategies that target both bid and ask price for maximising
profits.
Additionally, the adaptive mechanism compensated the non-
stationary features of the financial time series. However, the
re-training processes increased the computational complexity.
The rapidly growing trading frequency increased the non-
stationarity of the time series and at the same time decreased
the tolerance of latency for model re-training. But an increased
non-stationarity requires more re-training. To solve this con-
tradictory problem, additional to the adaptive mechanism,
one strand of the future works might be building a method
that removes or partially removes the non-stationarity while
maintaining the necessary statistical features.
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